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The United States Senate

R 1572

Report of Proceedings

[redacted]
DATE 3/19/77
BY EG

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

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Thursday, October 9, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction.)

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

Thursday, October 10, 1975

- - -

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:25 o'clock a.m. in Room 407, The Capitol, the Honorable Richard Schweiker presiding.

Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).

Also present: Frederick Baron and Rhett Dawson, Professional Staff Members.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

Senator Schweiker. Would you raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Tweedy. I do.

Senator Schweiker. It has been nice meeting you.

Mr. Tweedy. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, Senator Schweiker left the hearing room.)

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, you have just received the oath from Senator Schweiker, who has now left the room, and you are under no obligation to continue to testify in his absence, but obviously the Committee would appreciate it greatly if you would continue to testify.

Are you willing to continue to testify in the Senator's absence?

Mr. Tweedy. I plan to testify fully.

Mr. Baron. You are willing to testify to the truth as best as you can do it?

Mr. Tweedy. I will indeed.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware that you have the right to counsel?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. You are appearing here voluntarily without

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counsel?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that you may cease answering questions at any point if you wish to consult with counsel?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. Finally, are you aware that all of your Constitutional rights are intact, including your Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. All right, then.

Let us proceed to review a set of documents which were not available to us in your first examination. The attempt here today is not to go over a lot of old ground that we covered in your first examination but to focus our concerns on a few main events in the alleged story of an assassination plot against Lumumba, and to refresh your recollection by review of these documents.

Let me introduce as Exhibit 1 a cable from Allen Dulles to the Leopoldville Station, marked for Robert Guthman on October 26th, 1960.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 1 for identification.)

TESTIMONY OF BRONSON TWEEDY

Mr. Baron. We discussed this cable in your previous appearance, did we not?

Mr. Tweedy. August 26th.

May I correct the date? It is August 26th.

Mr. Baron. Certainly.

Mr. Tweedy. It is rather important.

Mr. Baron. It is August 26th.

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, we did indeed discuss it the last time.

Mr. Baron. After you took another look at this cable this morning before we went on the record, you made a remark to the effect that this cable was a source of authority as far as you were concerned at the time.

Is that your impression now?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Let me just add to that a bit. The cable per se I did not remember, but it is perfectly obvious the cable is the authority. When I first talked to Mr. Bissell about this, he certainly implied the only reason the subject was being raised is because it had been of national policy level concern. I do not think it could be more clear-cut than that. This was basically, this was the formal expression of that by the Director himself.

I cannot remember which came first, did I see this cable first, or did I talk to Mr. Bissell first. I suspect that I talked to Mr. Bissell first. It must have been absolutely in

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the same time period.

This merely confirmed what I think I probably heard from Mr. Bissell first.

Mr. Baron. In this discussion with Mr. Bissell, you are referring to the subject of getting access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassination.

Mr. Tweedy. I think it probably came up in the sense that the thrust of the American position was that there was no solution in the Congo without the fall from power of Mr. Lumumba, and no measure should be overlooked to achieve this -- constitutional, revolutionary and indeed, executive action, if you want to call it that.

Mr. Baron. Meaning assassination?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

But none of these possible measures were excluded, and the main point was that everybody agreed that Lumumba had to go or we were in for very serious trouble in the Congo.

Mr. Baron. You were referring a moment ago in discussing this cable from Allen Dulles to the fact that when you first discussed the possibility of assassinating Lumumba as one means of removing him from power with Richard Bissell, Bissell referred to this cable.

Mr. Tweedy. No, I would have seen this cable when it went out. I am afraid you cannot pin me down on this, because I cannot remember the sequence of events. It would have been a

perfectly natural follow-up to my discussion with Bissell. It is conceivable that this went out before I talked to Bissell, I do not exclude that, but the two were totally in tandem.

Mr. Baron. Having taken a look at all of the documents that we are about to introduce into the record today, before we begin taking your testimony on the record, are you able to pinpoint with any more precision your initial discussion with Mr. Bissell of the prospect of assassinating Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. Pinpoint it in terms of time?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Tweedy. No, not in terms of time. I can only assume --

Mr. Baron. It would have taken place shortly before this Allen Dulles cable?

Mr. Tweedy. Either shortly before, or shortly after, because the next series of cables obviously get the show, as it were, on the road.

May I comment just generally on those cables as a group? There are no surprises in them as far as I am concerned, in terms of detail. Much of it, even to this day, I still do not remember.

One aspect emerges very clearly for me, that we were very careful about examining this on the possibilities of doing anything against Lumumba. Basically, this whole period was a series of exchanges with the field who were seeking, as you can see from that cable traffic, various measures that might perform

or achieve the goal, including, indded assassination, but not by any means limited to that, that we were in trouble finding means which appeared secure, particularly means which kept the U.S. hand hidden. It is the to and from, and the atmosphere of it which is very familiar to me; the details of it, much of it even on reading them, is rather unfamiliar to me. I found no surprises in it.

Mr. Baron. Having refreshed your recollection by reviewing these cables, can you add any greater specificity to the record about the substance of your conversations with Richard Bissell on the possibility of assassinating Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. I think what we used to do, as I remember it, when it came to the technical exchange with the Station on one asset versus another, the possible security weakness of this man versus the possible strengths of another, Bissell left this largely to me. I do not mean to say that we did not from time to time review it. He did not debate with me on whether White Clam, lu was somebody who was worth dealing with or not, because he had Belgian connections, for example.

Mr. Baron. You are saying he would have left the operational details to you?

Mr. Tweedy. The operational details of trying to come up with some solution that looked as if it made sense, and had a promise of success. I do not recall that we would discuss this type of a cable in detail. As you can see, he released quite

a number of them, because he wanted to remain familiar with them.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. Back on the record on this subject.

Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not have any further recollection of detailed discussions with Bissell on this. On the other hand, it was perfectly clear that he remained actively interested in it. I am sure that he was the one that had the idea of Justin O'Donnell, for example, I think he undoubtedly came up with that idea. As you recall, I had forgotten entirely that Justin O'Donnell had ever played a role in this. I am sure when he fixed on O'Donnell the possibility to assist the Chief of Station he must have discussed this with him. I can almost say I remember it, but hardly.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of what Bissell said to you in the series of discussions on the prospect of assassinating Lumumba about the level at which the exploration of this prospect had been authorized?

Mr. Tweedy. No. That is the aspect I was never clear on except that it was perfectly clear to me that he was quite confident that this was -- I am now talking about the elimination of Lumumba by whatever means. I am not talking necessarily about assassination; I want to be quite clear on that.

I was quite clear in my mind that the policy levels of Washington were agreed that Lumumba must go. I cannot go any

further than that. I cannot say, for example, that Bissell said I think as an Agency we should consider assassination on this or that this had been discussed with the policy levels of government. I do not know, and it was never made clear to me nor does this cable make clear, but it was perfectly clear that Mr. Dulles felt quite quiet in his mind about discussing any of these aspects with the State Department or the Ambassador.

Mr. Baron. Off the record.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Baron. We are back on the record now.

When we stopped, we were discussing your account of your meetings with Richard Bissell where the subject of assassinating Lumumba had arisen among other means that had been considered in disposing of Lumumba. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate directly or indirectly to you that he had the authority of the President of the United States for moving forward with an operation which might include assassinating Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. Let me make it quite clear, he certainly never mentioned the President at all.

Mr. Baron. By name?

Mr. Tweedy. By name, or even by any indication. It was merely my impression reinforced, certainly, either before or after, of this cable of Allen Dulles that this was a policy level decision, but the extent to which the Executive had assassination discussed with him at all, I cannot comment on.

It is perfectly obvious that the Agency felt that it had the support of the Executive in efforts to eliminate Lumumba. It was at least my impression throughout this whole period that if it ever came down to the point where somebody said, I think we can do it, and we decided upon the means, that someone would have said, well, before we do, obviously there has to be final approval. I would not have known where the final approval would have come from. I would not expect that my correspondence with the Chief of Station in Leopoldville would result in the assassination of Mr. Lumumba without further reference.

Mr. Baron. You were under the impression that whatever steps you were involved in toward eliminating Lumumba, as you put it, were fully authorized at the highest level of the government?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I was.

Mr. Baron. That would include the President?

Mr. Tweedy. I do not really think I can answer that question, Mr. Baron. When somebody at my level, fairly senior though it was, receives clear-cut assurances that the policy level wants something done, it is very difficult for him to judge whether the President per se has been in contact with the Agency or that he has done this through his National Security Advisor, the Secretary of State, or whoever. There could be no way that I could judge that.

I think it would be quite misleading if I were to try to

read into it either then or now.

Mr. Baron. Whatever impression you had of the extent of the authority for the steps that you were taking to eliminate Lumumba was derived from your conversations with Richard Bissell?

Mr. Tweedy. And the cable.

Mr. Baron. And the cable by Allen Dulles.

Mr. Tweedy. Which merely indicated to me that the Agency was confident that it had its policy guidance and was thus acting accordingly.

Mr. Baron. Between this cable on August 26th which Allen Dulles dispatched to the Congo and the cable we will now mark Exhibit 2, which is a cable from yourself to Leopoldville on September 19th, marked Eyes Only, Guthman from Jadwin--

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

Mr. Baron. Were there any other meetings that you recall between yourself and Richard Bissell where he asked you to move beyond the exploratory stage to the implementation stage in assassinating Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. I do not know at all. I just do not recall that that ever occurred.

Mr. Baron. Let us turn, then, to this cable.

This cable indicates --

Mr. Tweedy. This is the one on the 19th?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. Back on the record.

This cable begins with your indication to the Chief of Station that someone was proceeding shortly to the Congo who would announce himself as Sid from Paris.

First of all, to backtrack, Guthman, in this cable, is the Chief of Station, is that right?

Mr. Tweedy. Correct.

Mr. Baron. Who we agreed would be referred to as the Chief of Station or by his alias, Hedgmena, and Jadwin is --

Mr. Tweedy. My pseudonym.

Mr. Baron. Did you have a first name in the pseudonym?

Mr. Tweedy. Thomas K.

Mr. Baron. Who was Sid from Paris?

Mr. Tweedy. I was trying to think. The identity is Sid

Brown. Sid Brown as a name means nothing to me.

Mr. Baron. If I represent to you that we have had testimony from Sidney Gottlieb that this identity stood for himself, does that refresh your recollection?

Mr. Tweedy. It would not surprise me. It was my assumption that it probably was, but I could not recall, so I find -- in other words, your explanation, I think, is what I would have expected.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection of dispatching Sidney Gottlieb on a mission to the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. I have the most unclear recollection that I discussed with Mr. Bissell Sidney Gottlieb's going to the Congo. I have no recollections of any conversations I had with Mr. Gottlieb himself, although I am quite convinced I had them.

In other words, it is inconceivable to me that he would have gone to the Congo without seeing me. I cannot recall the substance of our discussions, although I assume, and I imagine Mr. Bissell must have shared in this, we discussed what it was all about, the operational problems involved, so that he, in turn, could be somewhat sensible about what his own supporting role in this might be.

When I say this, it is a reasonable assumption but it is not direct recollection.

Mr. Baron. Does this cable indicate to you that you did

dispatch Sidney Gottlieb to the Congo on a highly sensitive mission?

Mr. Tweedy. It does indeed.

When you say I dispatched him, I would say it would be more accurate to say that Mr. Bissell and I dispatched him. I am sure the authority for him going would have come from he rather than me, but we arranged the details.

Mr. Baron. Your comment about the fact that the authority would have flowed from Mr. Bissell directy is borne out, is it not, by Mr. Bissell's initials on this cable?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, exactly.

Mr. Baron. Was that a fairly unusual practice, to have both the DDP and the Chief of the Africa Division sign a cable?

Mr. Tweedy. Quite common. Throughout the organization on matters of either particular sensitivity or so important that the DDP wished to be constantly informed about correspondence on a subject, the Chief of the Division would originate and send out cables and have it actually signed off by the DDP. That was quite a common practice in the Agency.

Mr. Baron. Do you have a recollection, having seen this document, of the fact that you set up a special channel using the YQPROP sensitivity indicator?

Mr. Tweedy. I did not recall YQPROP, but I recall special channels.

Mr. Baron. This would have restricted all traffic from yourself to Chief of Station, is that correct?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes. My Deputy would also have access to it in my absence.

Mr. Baron. That would be Glen Fields?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Would Richard Bissell have access to it?

Mr. Tweedy. Indeed he would.

Mr. Baron. Allen Dulles also?

Mr. Tweedy. Certainly if he wanted, absolutely.

Mr. Baron. Why was a special communications channel set up in this cable?

Mr. Tweedy. Because of the sensitivity of the subject. This, again, was a frequent procedure in the Agency on sensitive matters. If one was about to mount a sensitive operation, one of the first things normally done was to set up special communications procedures so the dissemination of the messages could be restricted to what was required.

Mr. Baron. In this case, the especially sensitive subject to which you were restricting communications access was the elimination of Lumumba by one means or another?

Mr. Tweedy. That is correct.

Mr. Baron. What was the assignment that Sidney Gottlieb was to explain to the Chief of Station when he arrived in the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. That, I do not recall. I can only assume that Sidney Gottlieb would have discussed with the Chief of Station instruments which TSD might have which could be of assistance in an assassination attempt. I assumed he discussed his inventory, whatever it might be, and the two presumably were trying to come to some conclusions as to what might have the best chance or the most practical chance of being used.

This is my assumption. I think in this early stage, that would have been the purpose of the exercise.

Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you the testimony of Sidney Gottlieb about two conversations that he had at Headquarters before he undertook the mission to the Congo in September of 1960.

First, when Dr. Gottlieb looked at this cable and some subsequent cables which we will discuss today, he said these cables applied to himself. He confirmed the fact that he took a trip to the Congo and arrived on September 26th as is indicated by a subsequent cable, and left on October 5th, as is indicated by another cable.

Dr. Gottlieb said before he left the Congo -- I am sorry, before he left for the Congo -- he had a conversation with you and Glen Fields in which you instructed him to take a lethal material to the Congo and give it to the Chief of Station with instructions to assassinate Lumumba if it were possible and to instruct the Chief of Station in the technical means by

which this lethal material could be administered through Lumumba's food or toothpaste or something that he would ingest.

Mr. Gottlieb also testified that in that conversation you indicated to him that these instructions were being given at Richard Bissell's authority.

Did that conversation take place?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Tweedy. His testimony does not basically refresh my memory. The only aspect of it which I would find unrealistic is that he had an instruction from me to tell the Chief of Station to use this material and go ahead and assassinate Lumumba, as if, in effect, that is all the authority that was necessary.

To be frank, that does not make sense. The rest of it is perfectly feasible. I do not recall it in the detail, but I am not going to deny what Sid said. I think his recollection that I told him, in effect, to go to the Chief of Station and sort of get the show on the road and use the poison and assassinate Lumumba without any further ceremony is just not the way it would have happened.

Mr. Baron. Why is that?

Mr. Tweedy. For the simple reason that under no circumstances would that instruction have been given by me without reference to higher authority up through the chain of command.

Mr. Baron. When you say reference to higher authority, what do you mean?

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Mr. Tweedy. My higher authority in the first instance would be Mr. Bissell.

Mr. Baron. Dr. Gottlieb did testify --

Mr. Tweedy. I understand.

Mr. Baron. -- that you referred in your conversation with him to the fact that you had authority from Mr. Bissell for the assignment you were giving to Gottlieb.

Mr. Tweedy. The only thing that Mr. Gottlieb would disagree on is that there would be no further reference, which his statement implies from Leopoldville before they took any action on this matter, in other words, take the final action on this matter, and that was never a matter, to the best of my recollection, that was ever delegated by Mr. Bissell. In other words, Mr. Bissell never said, look, you have the picture, go ahead and do it in your own good time without any further reference to me or anybody else, nor is the tenor of this correspondence as I read it that way at all.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall if Mr. Bissell ever went as far as telling you that if an opportunity arose to carry off the assassination of Lumumba in a situation where it would be practically impossible to confirm, that there was authority for proceeding with the assassination with Headquarters, that the Chief of Station would be, under those circumstances, authorized to proceed to assassinate Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not.

Mr. Baron. Do you have a recollection about that one way or the other?

Mr. Tweedy. I do not recall that he ever put it to me this way.

Mr. Baron. Let us then break down your statement about this meeting with Dr. Gottlieb into component parts.

You agree now, having heard Dr. Gottlieb's testimony, that it is true that you had asked Dr. Gottlieb to go to the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. Indeed, as I assumed I had, yes.

Mr. Baron. It is also true that you knew that Dr. Gottlieb was to carry a lethal material to the Chief of Station in the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. If he says so, I do not disagree with him. I do not frankly recall that at this point, but I am perfectly wedded to accept what he says.

Mr. Baron. Assuming, for the moment, that you would have required the Chief of Station to check back with Headquarters before he carried out an assassination mission, would it be true that you assigned Dr. Gottlieb the task of instructing the Chief of Station to assassinate Lumumba on that basis?

Mr. Tweedy. Dr. Gottlieb was the head of the Technical Services Division, or whatever it was called in those days.

Mr. Baron. Let me jump in for a moment.

At this point, for about a year and a half, he was the Science Advisor to Mr. Bissell, and he moved to Technical

Services shortly thereafter.

Mr. Tweedy. The way you put it to me was that I instructed Gottlieb to assassinate Lumumba. The answer to that is, I am sure I never instructed Gottlieb to assassinate Lumumba. This is the way you put it to me.

Mr. Baron. Let me correct that.

What I meant to say was, would you have asked Gottlieb to convey the instruction to the Chief of Station that he was to assassinate Lumumba if he found a way to do it and if he confirmed it with Headquarters?

Mr. Tweedy. My answer to that is almost certainly not. That would have been covered in other correspondence, which I think is demonstrated by these cables, to the Chief of Station direct from me with authority of Mr. Bissell. I would not have used, neither would Mr. Bissell, Mr. Gottlieb as the channel for this instruction.

Mr. Baron. Dr. Gottlieb has also testified that, aside from carrying the materials to the Chief of Station and instructing in their use and giving him an instruction about a mission to assassinate Lumumba, that he had one further role in the Congo; he was to serve as a technical advisor to the Chief of Station on the feasibility of using these biological substances to carry off the operation.

As Gottlieb put it, Gottlieb was to stay down there for a short period of time to determine the technical feasibility

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of the operational plan that the Chief of Station might come up with.

Mr. Tweedy. This seems quite reasonable to me. Presumably with his technical knowledge of the nature of these materials he would be in a position to either comment on or advise the Chief of Station as he attempted to put together some kind of operation. That makes good sense to me.

He would require, basically, a technical advisor.

Mr. Baron. Dr. Gottlieb also testified that the materials he took with him were of a fairly short life. Their toxicity would wane within a matter of weeks.

Given that bit of information to refresh your recollection, does that make it more likely that Gottlieb was there to aid the Chief of Station in actually carrying off the administration of these drugs, as opposed to giving him general instructions in the use of such lethal substances?

Mr. Tweedy. I do not know really that I can comment on that. If the materials would deteriorate fast, the use of them, if possible, I would stress the latter, would necessarily have to be expeditied, but the overwhelming concern of Headquarters and the field, again, demonstrated in this correspondence was our concern that this thing could be done at all, that it be done right, securely, and that the U.S. hand should be concealed.

If this were at odds with the life of these materials, I

tape 1b

think that would have just been too bad. But I think it is perfectly clear that we would not have expedited anything at the risk of doing it unprofessionally.

Mr. Baron. At the point that Gottlieb left for the Congo after talking with you, would he have been enpowered to convey to the Chief of Station that an assassination of Lumumba could be carried off if he could meet the criteria you just laid out, concealment of the U.S. hand and use of these materials before their potency waned?

Mr. Tweedy. My answer to that would be he would be in no position to do anything more with the Chief of Station if they reached that point in planning, that as of the last time he was at Headquarters that there would probably be an approval from Washington.

Mr. Baron. You would expect, then, the Chief of Station would have been expected to reconfirm with Headquarters the fact that he had a go-ahead?

Mr. Tweedy. It would never have occurred to me otherwise.

Mr. Baron. It would be your testimony that, although you do not specifically recall your conversation with Dr. Gottlieb, you would have made that clear to Dr. Gottlieb?

Mr. Tweedy. I would have thought so, yes, but I could not comment any further.

Mr. Baron. The reason for that is you do not recall the conversation?

Mr. Tweedy. Not only that; Dr. Gottlieb was as familiar as I was with (a) the sensitivity of this particular project and what was involved and the way that the Agency did its business, which was things of this kind were not dealt with on sort of an offhand basis.

Mr. Dawson. What is offhand?

Mr. Tweedy. The fact that the field and Dr. Gottlieb were given something in the nature of a blank check as to how they would go about it and when, without further reference to Headquarters.

Mr. Dawson. If we are to tie this to the cables, then, is there something in the cables predating Gottlieb's visit to the Congo which would lead you to believe that it had previously been authorized by some words in those cables?

Mr. Tweedy. What, Mr. Dawson, had previously been authorized?

Mr. Dawson. The authorization of the assassination effort, the elimination of Lumumba.

Mr. Tweedy. Only in the most general terms. No operation had been put forward by the field. In our business, these things were done by operational planning, at which point one came up with an operation that was agreed upon by the Station and by Headquarters, and this, then, would have been either implemented or not, according to the say-so from Headquarters.

Mr. Dawson. That kind of operational planning is

after Mr. Gottlieb arrives in the Congo, is that correct?

Mr. Tweedy. This, in effect, is that (Indicating). You can tell by the Chief of Station, there is no further reference to Mr. Gottlieb, as I recall.

Mr. Baron. In this cable traffic?

Mr. Tweedy. In this cable traffic, was looking at all sorts of ways and means of eliminating Lumumba, not restricted to assassination, which coincides exactly with my recollection of the period between when the subject was first broached to the Station and that rather indefinable period when, in effect, it was all over, which, I suppose, basically is the disappearance of Lumumba.

I think all of this traffic supports my contention that under the instructions he was given, the Chief of Station in Leopoldville set about exploring all alleys and found none crystal clear. There were problems with all of them. Some looked more promising than others. Individuals who might be used obviously looked more promising than others. Some were discussed and discarded. We commented on some. And so it went.

Mr. Baron. I think that we should proceed in a moment to go through these cables with a close eye, one by one.

One further point in Dr. Gottlieb's testimony, to be fair to him, he said he was under the impression that it was general Agency procedure that in a mission like this one the Chief of

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Station probably would check back with Headquarters, that any prudent Chief of Station would check back to reconfirm his authorityto go ahead with an assassination operation, but Dr. Gottlieb said in his conversation with you he was not told that he should convey to the Chief of Station the requirement that he should check back with Headquarters before he proceeded with the assassination of Lumumba.

Mr. Tweedy. I cannot comment on his statements, because I cannot recall what I said to him. It certainly is perfectly conceivable to me that I could have had this conversation with him and not mentioned this, that this would be covered in all the basic correspondence that I was having with the Chief of Station.

Mr. Baron. So then it is possible -- or is it probable that in your instructions to Sidney Gottlieb about his mission to the Congo you might not have explicitly mentioned the requirement that the Chief of Station return to Headquarters to reconfirm his authority to move ahead with the assassination.

Mr. Tweedy. It is, I suppose, possible. I am not going to say it is not possible. I am merely saying that that is not the way we did business, and on the whole, Sidney Gottlieb would be as familiar with that as I would -- perhaps not as familiar with it, because he was on the technical side where I was on the operational side and used to this chain of command thing and the relationship between the Division and Station

Chiefs in the field, to a greater extent than Dr. Gottlieb would.

The last thing I am doing is impugning his veracity and his testimony.

Mr. Baron. When you say it is not the way we do business, you meant to say it was your understanding in general Agency practice that the Chief of Station in a situation like this would be expected to check back with Headquarters?

Mr. Tweedy. When a Chief of Station was given the authority to carry out something entirely on his own initiative, that was made quite clear -- I'm not talking about this case, I mean generally -- this was made quite clear.

Mr. Baron. When you were talking about the fact that "this was not the way that we generally did business," you were not referring to the fact that you would have made it absolutely explicit in any conversation with Sidney Gottlieb or anybody like him who was undertaking a sensitive mission that the Chief of Station would be expected to check back?

Mr. Tweedy. If I had not mentioned this to Sidney Gottlieb and he said I did not, I am perfectly prepared to believe him, it would be because it never occurred to me that the Chief of Station would act in any other way. That is it.

Mr. Dawson. Of course, Mr. Hedgeman also testified that it never would have occured to him to have carried this out without having checked back, and he did so, of course; the cables will show that very clearly. What we are trying to focus

on is exactly what Mr. Gottlieb conveyed to Mr. Hedgeman, which, of course, you could not testify to.

Mr. Tweedy. I could not.

Mr. Baron. Or what you said to him.

Mr. Tweedy. I think it is quite possible that I did not say to Mr. Gottlieb, Sid, for Heaven's sake, do not have the Chief of Station go off assassinating this fellow without referring back to Headquarters. It would never have occurred to me to do that. It would have been, in my view, superfluous.

Mr. Dawson. You are, of course, aware that Mr. Hedgeman was aware of this practice in the Agency?

Mr. Tweedy. Certainly.

Mr. Dawson. You had seen that happen. He had only been Station Chief for a short time; in spite of that, he was still aware of Agency practice?

Mr. Tweedy. I think that it would be perfectly true to say that any clandestine services officer who had reached a certain seniority in field experience whether he was Chief of Station or not, he would have sucked this in with his mother's milk. We were, if I may say so, a very disciplined organization in that regard.

Mr. Dawson. Specifically as to Mr. Hedgeman, that would apply to him also?

Mr. Tweedy. It would indeed.

Mr. Baron. Let us proceed then to a document we will mark

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Exhibit 3, which is a cable from Bronson Tweedy to the Chief of Station for his eyes only on September 22, 1960.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 3 for identification.)

Mr. Tweedy. This is mostly discussion of [redacted]

Mr. Baron. The man you referred to was at this time an agent that was in contact with the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. I remember him very well. I could not possibly remember his name. I remember him very well; I met him later.

Mr. Baron. He proved to be a highly effective agent for the Station?

Mr. Tweedy. He was a very good intelligence agent, an excellent intelligence agent, for the simple reason that he was able to make contact with groups and media in the Congo which was very difficult for non-Africans to reach. He was, for a year or two, a first-class intelligence source basically: not an action source, but an intelligence source.

Mr. Baron. When you read the sentence that is at the beginning of paragraph B on the first page where it says: "Concur this possibility worth watching, but if decided support for YQPROP objectives. Believe essential such be provided through third national channel with PBPRIME role completely concealed."

What are you referring to there?

Mr. Tweedy. I am not sure; I do not remember. I do not recall what the incoming cable said.

What I am obviously saying is [redacted] had, I guess, an [redacted] wife who was, at least had been, [redacted] [redacted] I think what I was saying is, if we wanted to use

[redacted] directly in an assassination attempt, that I would not dismiss it out of hand.

Mr. Baron. You would be concerned about its security?

Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely.

Mr. Baron. You then would say the phrase "YOPROP objectives" would refer to an assassination attempt?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. That the assassination, discussion of an assassination attempt, was being restricted to the YOPROP channel?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. On the last page of this document --

Mr. Tweedy. The only thing that worries me about this conclusion of mine is this, the more I read it, 2-B is another paragraph, which may not have had anything to do with [redacted] at all and I do not feel, at least I cannot recollect, why any leaks would almost certainly have included the [redacted] if [redacted] were involved in this. Thus, I am inclined to feel I am talking about somebody else and not [redacted].

Mr. Baron. I will represent to you in other cable traffic, I believe, which we will review as we proceed here, there was discussion of the use of ano[illegible].

Mr. Tweedy. This was probably the case. I do not think this refers to [redacted]. B here I do not think refers to [redacted]. I cannot recall --

Mr. Baron. Who?

YQPROP objectives would still refer to exploring possibilities to an assassination attempt?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. This may refer to exploring it with a different agent?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. On the last page, paragraph 3, it tells the Chief of Station: "Not intended you construe above comments as basically negative. You and colleague understand we cannot read over your shoulder as you plan and assess opportunities. Our primary concern must be concealment PBPRIME role unless outstanding opportunity emerges which makes calculated risk first class bet. Ready entertain any serious proposals you make based our high regard both your professional judgments."

What are you referring to in that paragraph? What message are you conveying to the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. Well, I think if you read the cable you will notice that we have found difficulty with a number of his proposals. These were exploratory proposals. I wanted --

Mr. Baron. For carrying off an assassination mission?

Mr. Tweedy. You keep coming off with an assassination mission as if this was always just around the corner. What I am saying is, we are in a period here quite common in our business of very intensive operational planning and exploration.

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All sorts of things were coming up from the field. I had commented on it here; in the end, I say, do not be discouraged because you do not see the probable channel we will use. I assume the colleague was Sid Gottlieb, because I guess he was still there.

Mr. Baron. The first time he had not arrived, but you had already cabled that his arrival was imminent?

Mr. Tweedy. I assume that that is the colleague. I do not think he would have talked to anybody else on it. That is all it means.

It is, if you like, a technique of management.

Mr. Baron. Moving on to a document that we will mark Exhibit 4, the next cable, is from Allen W. Dulles of September 24, 1960 and your pseudonym is also listed as one of the senders of the cable to the Chief of Station.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)

Mr. Baron. In this cable, in the first paragraph, it says: "We wish give every possible support in eliminating Lumumba from any possibility resuming governmental position or if he fails in Leop" -- meaning Leopoldville -- "setting himself in Stanleyville or elsewhere."

First, for the record, any time your pseudonym "Jadwin" or your name "Tweedy" appears in the upper lefthand corner of a cable or your signature appears on the bottom, you dispatched that cable? Is that not right?

I am referring generally to the cable traffic.

Mr. Tweedy. What it means is this. It could mean several things, but I personally dictated the cable and dispatched it without further reference, or for some reason I constructed the cable and had it released by a higher authority, either Mr. Bissell or Mr. Dulles. Although those were not the only alternatives, if my name was on it, I was connected with it in one form or another.

I would guess that I dictated the cable and that Mr. Dulles -- and I do not have any idea how this came about -- Mr. Dulles wanted to see it, and Mr. Bissell suggested that it go out from Mr. Dulles and myself, I just do not know. What this means is, Dulles and Tweedy were totally aware of the cable.

Mr. Baron. Returning then to the sentence I cited from the cable where you and Dulles were talking about giving every possible support in eliminating Lumumba, what message --

Mr. Tweedy. "Eliminating Lumumba from any possibility resuming governmental position." This, if I may say so, reverts to the original instruction from Mr. Dulles which was that the U.S. position was that Mr. Lumumba must be removed from a position of authority in the Congo and that assassination was not by any means the only way by which this might be accomplished.

This, I think, merely reiterates that it is not a -- being a YQPROP cable does not refer specifically to assassination.

Mr. Baron. Would this cable, in using the phrase "eliminating Lumumba" in this context contemplate assassination as at least one of the possible means that might be used?

Mr. Tweedy. I am afraid if I may say so you are putting words in my mouth. This is exactly what it says. He has two messages now from Mr. Dulles. The first one, I think, was perfectly clear. Since then he has had messages from Mr. Dulles' subordinates like myself. This merely makes it clear again that Headquarters wishes to "give every possible support in eliminating Lumumba from any possibility resuming governmental position." and I cannot say more than that, and I think to say that this stresses assassination would be quite untrue. But the Chief of Station in Leopoldville was already under instruction to be considering this as one of the possibilities.

Mr. Baron. Assassination?

Mr. Tweedy. This does not change that.

Mr. Baron. I think that is fine.

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The interesting aspect of that sentence for me is the rest of the sentence where it makes it clear that not only is there a concern about Lumumba being able to resume his position in Leopoldville, but anywhere else, and it would seem that assassination would at least have to be one of very few means that could insure that fact that Lumumba would not resume a position of power anywhere.

Mr. Tweedy. I do not think I can comment any further.

Mr. Baron. Let us introduce as Exhibit 5 a cable dispatched from the Chief of Station on September 27th, 1960 for your eyes only, and this cable begins with a reference to Dr. Gottlieb.

It says he was contacted 26 September. "We on same wave length." Then it continues, "Hence believe most rapid action consistent with security indicated."

The next paragraph says, "Basis 2 talks considering possibilities:" -- there follows a list of possibilities from A to G and paragraph 3 on the bottom of page 2 says, "Plan proceed on basis priorities as listed above, unless instructed to contrary."

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 5 for identification.)

Mr. Baron. Does that indicate to you that on the list of priorities, priority A would have been considered by the Chief of Station to be his top priority?

Mr. Tweedy. Can you read, by the way, paragraph 2: "Basis 2 talks considering possibilities" of dispatching [redacted] to Stanleyville and taking refuge -- that would be refuge, would it not?

Mr. Baron. Yes. "Recall [redacted] from Stanleyville" --

Mr. Tweedy. -- "and have him take refuge with Big Brother" --

Mr. Baron. -- "Would thus act as inside man to brush up details to razor edge. Also would provide info on food and agricultural problem. Guthman recalling [redacted] to Leop."

When Dr. Gottlieb looked at this cable, he testified that this cable indicated that he arrived in the Congo on the 26th of September. He had two talks with the Chief of Station where they discussed various operational possibilities of getting rid of Lumumba. The letter A represented their top priority plan.

Would you agree with that interpretation of the cable?

Mr. Tweedy. I would think so.

Mr. Baron. Would you --

Mr. Tweedy. When he says: "Plan proceed on basis priorities as listed above" this again is not what he was going to do at the conclusion of this without further reference carry out an assassination. He says, what we see is [redacted] the

best answer to our problem.

Mr. Baron. Does he not indicate in this cable though that he would proceed to implement these plans unless he were instructed to the contrary? In other words, this very cable might constitute his request for a confirmation.

Mr. Tweedy. I disagree. I think these various possibilities still need further exploration is what he was suggesting to Headquarters he concentrate on, that is the best possible use of Schotroffe on this including further operational intelligence on the situation which might lead to an agreement that we would use this man, and then all these others, but it does not in any sense, as far as I am concerned, it is not in any sense the Chief of Station saying, if A looks terribly good I shall just go ahead and finish the job without further reference. Not at all.

Mr. Baron. I do not understand how you can read the phrase "unless instructed to the contrary" in that way.

Mr. Tweedy. Because there are other possibilities here. I am sorry, but I am afraid looking at it fifteen years later -- in the subject that you are engaged in, I think you would look at it entirely differently than I would, working on a day-to-day matter with the Chief of Station. There is absolutely nothing in this cable which says that they have the answer to Schotroffe's use.

Mr. Baron. Does paragraph A indicate that Schotroffe would

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take refuge with Big Brother, meaning move into Lumumba's entourage?

Mr. Tweedy. I think probably this would be -- I am trying to think how this was.

Was this possibly [redacted]?

Mr. Baron. I do not know the operational details.

Mr. Tweedy. He did have some access to Lumumba's entourage, which was the reason we were so interested.

Mr. Baron. Would you assume that this cable is suggesting that [redacted] be recalled to Leopoldville so that he might move into Lumumba's entourage?

Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely.

Mr. Baron. Where it says he "would thus act as inside man to brush up details to razor edge," would you assume that refers to exploring the means by which Lumumba might be poisoned?

Mr. Tweedy. I think that is quite a possibility. I cannot specifically say yes. I suspect he was our best potential source for operational intelligence, if you like, on this.

Then he says "Also would provide info on food and agricultural problems." I have a vague recollection at this point that he was reporting rather importantly on aspects of food and agriculture which was a major political factor within the Congo then. I cannot put it any more clearly than that.

I think it is that this would be a byproduct of this, that we would get more good reporting on the subject.

Mr. Baron. You would read that sentence literally instead of an oblique reference to getting access to Lumumba's food by which he might be poisoned?

Mr. Tweedy. I would read it much more literally than that.

Mr. Baron. Let us turn then to Exhibit 6, which is a cable from the Chief of Station on September 30th to Jadwin, which is yourself --

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 6 for identification.)

Mr. Baron. -- in which the Chief of Station says: "No really airtight op possible with assets now available. Must choose between cancelling op or accepting calculated risks of varying degrees."

[redacted] best asset available. View necessity act immediately, if at all, urge Headquarters authorize exploratory conversations to determine if [redacted] willing take role as active agent or cut-out this op."

First, would you read the sentence or the phrase "view necessity act immediately, if at all" to refer to the fact that at this point Gottlieb had informed the Chief of Station that the lethal material was of a limited life?

Mr. Tweedy. I cannot really comment on that. That is certainly a perfectly reasonable explanation for that remark, but as I do not know exactly where Lumumba sat on that particular moment when this cable was sent, it might have something to do with his availability or something else, I just do not know.

Certainly your first point is a possibility. It equally makes clear, of course, that although [redacted] had been used in an operational intelligence support role, he at this point had never been cut in on plans. Of course, Chief of Station did not know whether he would be willing to go along with this set up or not.

Mr. Baron. The Chief of Station here is considering an

approach to [redacted] first on a hypothetical basis --

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. It is clear here, is it not, that [redacted] is being viewed as a potential assassination asset?

Mr. Tweedy. Indeed.

Mr. Baron. Let us introduce as Exhibit 7 a cable on 30 September 1960 signed by Glen Fields to the Chief of Station, again in the YQPROP channel.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 7 for identification.)

Mr. Baron. Presumably, it is responding to the cable that we just looked at, and in this cable, Glen Fields says, "You are authorized have exploratory talks with Schotroffe to assess his attitude toward possible active agent or cut-out role."

Would you assume that Glen Fields consulted you before sending this authorization to the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. Not necessarily. I might have been out of town that day. As you will notice, all he says is, "You are authorized have exploratory talks" and "Agree with you initial discussions should be on hypothetical basis." And, of course, at that point, we would expect a report from the field on how it went. He was taking it one step further. He might not have cleared that with me if I were away. He might also have perhaps cleared it with Mr. Bissell.

Mr. Baron. As your Deputy, it would have been perfectly proper in your eyes for Glen Fields to have issued this cable without consulting you?

Mr. Tweedy. Certainly. It is quite possible, too, that he even told Mr. Bissell what he was planning to do. I cannot tell you specifically. This is all that this cable authorizes. I find it entirely within his delegated responsibilities.

Mr. Baron. Would it have been standard procedure for Glen Fields, in your absence, to mention to Richard Bissell the fact that such authorization to be sent to the Chief of Station

on an exceptional and sensitive mission like this one?

Mr. Tweedy. Would you say that again?

Mr. Baron. Would it have been standard procedure for Fields to check with Bissell in your absence before he sent such a cable?

Mr. Tweedy. No. Field's understanding of his authorities and his relationships with the DDP on such matters were exactly the same as mine. We would have seen eye to eye with him.

If I had sent the cable, undoubtedly I would have let Mr. Bissell know that I was planning to carry this thing that much closer. The reason for that is that we were getting close to informing a third party that this was in the wind. Therefore, before we actually took this step, I think something like this, a third party being [redacted].

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Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 8, we will introduce a cable on October 7th, 1960, from the Chief of Station to Jadwin, which is yourself.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 8 for identification.)

Mr. Baron. This cable begins with a reference to Sidney Gottlieb, and he: "Departed Leop for PBPRIME 5 October, view expiration date his materials. However, left certain items of continuing usefulness. Guthman plans continue try implement op."

Do you have any independent recollection of receiving this cable?

Mr. Tweedy. You know, it's terribly hard when you see something that clearly occurred, and to me I read, it's terribly hard at this stage to say, of course I remember. It all reads perfectly familiar to me now. To say quite specifically I recall receiving the cable will perhaps go a little beyond my memory.

Mr. Baron. Based upon having read this cable at that time, which you assume you did, is that correct?

Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely.

Mr. Baron. You would have known that Sidney Gottlieb had left the Congo on October 5th and that the Chief of Station planned to continue to try to implement the operation.

Mr. Tweedy. Which means that he would continue his exploratory operational work to see if he could come to some solution.

Mr. Baron. You would read that sentence still to apply to an exploratory phase, a phase in which the Chief of Station was exploring the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba as

opposed to moving to implementing?

Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely. Under no circumstances anything else.

Mr. Dawson. Based upon this Exhibit and the previous one then, Mr. Tweedy, is it your opinion that in this case no agent was ever asked to assassinate Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, indeed. That also coincides with my best recollection which is not all that damn good. It is perfectly obvious that [redacted] was never requested to assassinate Lumumba, and I have no recollection of anybody having been asked to do this.

Mr. Dawson. Whether the discussion was hypothetical, as outlined in the previous exhibit.

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Dawson. Why is it obvious that [redacted] was never asked to assassinate Lumumba in light of the sentence in this cable that reads, "Although did not pick up ball," -- referring to the fact that [redacted] did not necessarily pick up the ball on assassinating Lumumba in his conversation with the Chief of Station, the Chief of Station nevertheless believed "he prepared take any role necessary within limits security accomplish objective."

Does that not indicate that [redacted] was at least viewed as someone who was prepared to undertake an assassination mission if he should be tasked with it?

Mr. Tweedy. I did not say he was not. This at that time is the Chief of Station's best assessment of what the Schotroffe reaction would be if the thing was formally put to him so bluntly that he understood entirely what it was all about. I do not recall, I do not believe any of this residual traffic indicates that it ever got so far that we did that, and I think, my own belief is it is a 50-50 proposition on whether Schotroffe would agree to do it. I think probably in "limits security accomplish objective" is probably the controlling factor. I cannot really recall anymore.

Mr. Dawson. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. Back on the record.

This report on October 7th by the Chief of Station refers back to the exploratory conversations that he mentioned he was --

Mr. Tweedy. Implied to by Fields.

Mr. Baron. -- authorized by Fields in the previous cable of the 30th.

Mr. Tweedy. Right.

Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 9, we will introduce a cable signed by B. Tweedy to the Chief of Station in the YOPROP channel.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 9 for

identification.)

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Mr. Baron. It begins, "Had good discussion your colleague 7 October. Comments follow:"

"A. Be assured did not expect YQPROP objectives be reached in short period and understand current situation fully warranted return your colleague."

And then it continues to discuss the fact that you were considering dispatching a third country national operator and a senior case officer from the CIA who would "run this op and outside agent full time under your direction."

Does this cable refer to the fact that you debriefed Sidney Gottlieb?

Mr. Tweedy. I am sure it does. That is what it must be, yes.

Mr. Baron. The first paragraph is meant to indicate that the Chief of Station should not feel that Headquarters would be disappointed in the fact that he did not pull off an assassination mission in such a short period of time?

Mr. Tweedy. I want to be careful to how I reply to that. All I was saying to a very professional colleague was that we had no illusions about the fact that the planning operation of this would be very difficult, at best, and would take time and thoroughly agree with the fact that prospects, immediate prospects, were such that there was no alternative for Sidney Gottlieb to return. That is all I was saying.

But to say what I was trying to express to him was the

fact that we were not overly disappointed that Lumumba was not assassinated at this point is just not the level of intercourse that I had with a very professional Chief of Station. That is all.

Mr. Baron. Does not the paragraph A here indicate that the objective of the mission that was discussed in the YQPROP channel was to assassinate Lumumba in view or in light of the fact that Gottlieb had gone to the Congo with materials that were only going to be lethal for a short period of time?

Mr. Tweedy. That is what it says.

Mr. Baron. In other words, what I am trying to explore with you is your characterization of this entire stage of the operation as one of planning and exploration when we know that Gottlieb took materials to the Congo which would only be lethal for a short period of time and presumably was prepared to move from exploration to implementation?

Mr. Tweedy. If, as a result of the Station focusing on the problem for the first time, as a result of Headquarters' request, they had come up with a plan that they thought was exceedingly solid and which Headquarters approved, it is not surprising, perhaps, that we wanted the materials there to take advantage of such, if you like, an unlikely event. But this would not change the normal sequence of events, which would be that the Station would explore, keep Headquarters informed, Headquarters would comment, it would then be a cresendo of

agreement or no agreement at all resulting from either a final request for approval or either approval or no approval. This would not have changed.

Mr. Baron. Because Gottlieb took lethal materials to the Congo with him that had such a short period of lethality, were you not contemplating at that time that the operation might well move from the exploration phase to the implementation phase just as soon as Gottlieb and Hedgeman determined that it was feasible?

Mr. Tweedy. I think I would put it quite differently. I think that I would say that we would have been remiss in not being in a position to exploit, if we reached the point where we all agreed that the thing was possible.

If they had merely gone over and said we think we can do it, by why do you not send the stuff from Headquarters, that would have been sort of nonsense, if you follow me.

Mr. Baron. You would have expected the Chief of Station to cable back for confirmation, but it was certainly within your contemplation at the time that when Gottlieb went to the Congo, when the Chief of Station cabled for confirmation, you would probably give him a go ahead to assassinate Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. I did not say that at all.

Mr. Baron. If the operation were feasible?

Mr. Tweedy. I did not say that at all. It would not have

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been my say-so. I do not know what the policy levels of my Agency, who in turn would have been reflected in the policy levels of the government, would have done if it had come to the point where somebody said, we can do it, do you want us to do it.

Mr. Baron. You would have referred that to Bissell?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. He would have referred it?

Mr. Tweedy. He would have referred it according to his lights. That was not my business. He was his own level of authority. He was as aware of his authority as I was at my level. I only assume that this would have been discussed at the highest level, certainly at the Agency. I assume that the decision would have had to have been made by Allen Dulles and who else he wished to consult in Washington.

These are pure assumptions on my part. Under no circumstances would I have given the go ahead.

Mr. Dawson. That is interesting.

Mr. Baron. I just have one more question on this line. I realize we are going very closely over this ground. We would not be doing it if it weren't important in trying to get you to clarify for the record exactly what shade of meaning you want to attach here.

Would it be fair to say that when you dispatched Gottlieb to the Congo you expected to hear back --

Mr. Tweedy. I expected this would result in a dialogue between the Station and ourselves as to what might be feasible.

Mr. Baron. You were hoping?

Mr. Tweedy. Gottlieb assisting the Chief of Station in his explorations.

Mr. Baron. In view of the entire policy of the Agency at that time, as indicated in the cables of Dulles and the cables from yourself and Bissell to the Congo, you were hoping that Gottlieb and the Chief of Station would find a feasible means of carrying out an assassination mission and then inform you of that.

Mr. Tweedy. I am not going to comment on the hope. I do not know what my frame of mind was on that.

The purpose of the exercise was to see whether this was possible. One thing was clear, that I was the instrument of policy in carrying out the exploration which was entirely a professional matter. If the exploration had reached a point where we felt that we could submit to higher authority a plan which we thought made some sense, at that point higher authority would have to take the ball and run with it and let us know what they concluded.

Mr. Baron. By higher authority here, you mean any authority higher than yourself?

Mr. Tweedy. It would start with me in my chain of command. I would not be concerned with the National Security Advisor

to the President or anybody else, I was perfectly clear in my mind because of what had occurred and the way that these matters had been broached to the field by Mr. Dulles, that the thing was in the national arena and was just not in the Agency's arena.

What Mr. Dulles would have done and what he felt his authorities were from higher authority I cannot tell you.

Mr. Dawson. That would have been a matter that would have been between Mr. Bissell and Mr. Dulles, is that correct?

Mr. Tweedy. In the first instance, it would have been between Mr. Dulles and the outside world, the Executive.

Mr. Dawson. The chain of command would have been, you would have talked to Bissell, you would not have been expected or would have asked what Mr. Dulles' view were?

Mr. Tweedy. Mind you, we were also an Agency that was very flexible. I am not saying Mr. Dulles might not have talked to me about this, that was because Mr. Bissell was not immediately available, or something of this kind.

What I am saying is at the working level, the operational level, the Divisional and the Station level, we had come up with a plan which made professional sense to us which we felt sound enough so that we would present it to our masters, we would have done so and the resultant instruction to the field would have depended on their reaction as far as I was concerned within the Agency. As far as Mr. Dulles was concerned, I cannot

tell you.

In other words, the degree to which he thought he would have to refer further to Washington on, I have no idea.

Mr. Baron. It was your job to find a feasible way to carry out an assassination; it was the job of Bissell and those above him to decide whether to go ahead, as far as you were concerned?

Mr. Tweedy. As far as I was concerned, that is the way it started.

Mr. Dawson. You have no independent or specific recollection that you ever went to Mr. Bissell and said, we do not have a shot at this, or we do, and we could do it this way, and him saying one thing or another? You have no recollection either way?

Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Bissell read the same traffic I did.

Mr. Dawson. I did not know that.

Mr. Tweedy. He read these cables. When I say he read every single one of them word for word -- all I can say is he had full access to these cables and anything he had not read or had any reason to believe he had not read, I would have kept him generally briefed on the progress of the planning. Naturally, he would have been interested. He would not have followed it in detail.

Mr. Dawson. Would Mr. Dulles have had any access to these cables?

Mr. Tweedy. Not routinely. I think he would have expected

Mr. Bissell to keep him orally informed on a thing like this. He did not want any more paper floating around in those days. Mr. Dulles was in even another building. Now, we were all down at the Reflecting Pool at that point, were we not, and Mr. Dulles was on E Street. It doesn't make any difference. The number of papers on this YQPROP thing would have been restricted to the absolute minimum. I do not think Mr. Dulles would have expedted to be bothered with the operational details. What he would have expected from Mr. Bissell was progress on planning the elimination of Lumumba by whatever means.

Mr. Dawson. Was the routine way that that information would have been given to Mr. Dulles -- for instance, what I'm thinking was, were there staff meetings at which you attended with Mr. Bissell in Mr. Dulles' presence concerning what was happening generally on a routine quarterly or weekly basis?

Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Bissell would have seen Mr. Dulles by and large every day.

Mr. Dawson. They would not review meetings on a weekly or routine basis?

Mr. Tweedy. He had his own staff meeting every morning, Mr. Dulles did. These were attended by his Deputy Directors, of which Mr. Bissell was one.

I used to see Mr. Bissell -- he had a staff meeting once a week which all Chiefs of Division attended. Nothing like this would be discussed at those. I had my own private meetings

with him on these matters whenever it seemed necessary by one or the other of us.

Mr. Baron. Returning to the cable of October 7th, 1960, which you sent to the Chief of Station, the reference to a senior case officer who might be dispatched to the Congo, is that a reference to the fact that Bissell was considering dispatching Justin O'Donnell?

Mr. Tweedy. No other candidate, no other. I assume that is who it is.

Mr. Baron. O'Donnell's account that he was asked by Bissell to go to the Congo to carry off the assassination of Lumumba would fit here?

Mr. Tweedy. Sure.

Mr. Baron. The third country national referred to in this cable and in other cables as someone you are considering dispatching to the Congo to help with the operation, would that be QJWIN or WIROGUB?

Mr. Tweedy. As I told you before, definitely not WIROGUE. Presumably this other fellow, whose identity and what he was is very, very unclear to me.

Mr. Baron. The agent that was run by Arnold Silver.

Mr. Tweedy. Yes. This would have been the man that would have worked with Justin O'Donnell if it had all happened.

Mr. Baron. That was QJWIN. I will represent to you that QJWIN was the agent who was supervised by Justin O'Donnell.

Mr. Tweedy. We read that that time, which is my only recollection of it. That is the person I am sure.

Mr. Baron. Let me correct myself here.

I will represent to you that QJWIN was the agent that was recruited by Arnold Silver and sent by Silver to the Congo for use by O'Donnell and perhaps by the Chief of Station.

Is that consistent with your recollection?

Mr. Tweedy. No, it is not consistent with my recollection. It is certainly consistent with what I read the last time I saw you, which I have no reason to dispute. I just cannot remember the blighter at all.

Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 10, let us introduce a cable of October 15th, 1960, which is not sent in the YOPROP channel. It is marked RIBAT[redacted]FLAT in the space where sensitivity indicators are usually placed.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 10 for identification.)

Mr. Baron. This cable requests the views of the Chief of Station on suggestions A, B and C for various covert operations. In paragraph C, there is a reference to [redacted]ROAK.

Mr. Tweedy, we have received the representation from the CIA that that was a cryptonym used to refer to Lumumba. Is that consistent with your interaptation of the cable?

Mr. Baron. It is indeed.

Mr. Tweedy. This paragraph C says in part: "Only direct action we can now stand behind is to support immobolizing or arresting [redacted]ROAK, desirable as more definitive action might be. Any action taken would have to be entirely Congolese."

Now, you signed this cable, but it was not sent in the special sensitivity channel that dealt with Gottlieb's mission to the Congo?

Before we discuss this cable, let us also introduce into the record as Exhibit 11 another cable which you signed on October 15, 1960 which was sent in the YOPROP channel to the Chief of Station.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 11 for identification.)

NW

Mr. Baron. This contains the following language: "You will note from cable through normal channel currently being transmitted" then it continues "on YQPROP suggestions. You will probably receive more along these lines as stumbling bloc OZ WIROAK represents increasingly apparent all studying Congo situation closely and his disposition spontaneously becomes number one consideration."

Mr. Tweedy. I think by that, I think it is perfectly God-awful English.

Mr. Baron. The cable continues --

Mr. Tweedy. Obviously that means that everyone one talked to said there is no solution to the Congo as long as Lumumba stays in a position of power or influence there. That is what that means.

Mr. Baron. The cable continues: "Raise above so you not confused by any apparent duplication. This channel remains for specific purpose you discussed with colleague and also remains highest priority."

Now, does this pair of cables indicate that at this point despite the indication in the first cable that we looked at that "direct action would be limited to entirely Congolese action" the actual position of yourself and others at Headquarters involved in this operation was that exploration of an assassination mission remained the highest priority for the Chief of Station?

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Mr. Tweedy. I think that is accurate.

We had come to the end of the road, at least temporarily on the YQPROP aspect and for the time being we were in no position to approve anything but what was discussed in the WIFLAP cable. Nonetheless, as long as the threat to the Congo from Lumumba existed, there remained a high priority to search for means to take care of the YQPROP planning aspects.

Mr. Baron. When the cable refers to the specific purpose you discussed with colleague --

Mr. Tweedy. This is assassination with Gottlieb, I am sure.

Mr. Baron. It then says: This purpose remains highest priority. Would that not indicate to the Chief of Station that he should proceed to find a way that Lumumba could be assassinated?

Mr. Tweedy. What this would mean to the Chief of Station was that he should retain exploration of possible means of assassinating Lumumba as highest priority. He should continue to seek means to do this, not to do it.

Mr. Baron. Again, you are maintaining you have just made yourself clear, as far as you were concerned, you were still asking him to explore and not implement at this point?

Mr. Tweedy. Nothing else but.

Mr. Baron. Who would have had access to or received distribution of the first cable we looked at which travelled in

the WIFLAT channel?

Mr. Tweedy. It would have been restricted, but not as restricted as the other.

Mr. Baron. Would somebody at the Embassy conceivably have been cut in on cable traffic in the channel that dealt with WIFLAT operations?

Mr. Tweedy. Could be, certainly.

Mr. Baron. In other words, the purpose of sending a second cable on the same day which dealt with action against Lumumba was what?

Mr. Tweedy. The simple reason I think -- I say I think, because I cannot tell you so -- as I said a few minutes ago, obviously you'd come temporarily to the end of the line on YQPROP. Measures taken to shore up [redacted] position in the Congo, Mabutu, would have served to support the general objective, of containing Lumumba by whatever means. It is all part of the same purpose.

Once again referring to the original cable from Mr. Dulles which said all means, in effect, and I think the reason I'm putting this in the open channel, the open channel is still --

Mr. Baron. Simply the ordinary channel used between yourself --

Mr. Tweedy. Still a restricted channel. RIBAT is a restricted thing, in any event. This could have been discussed with the Ambassador or the Embassy, if any aspect of it seemed

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appropriate by the Chief of Station.

Mr. Baron. By contrast, the YQPROP cable would only have been seen by the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. The Embassy would not have been shown this cable anyway. We do not show the traffic to the Embassy; we discussed it.

Mr. Baron. It would have been propr for the [illegible]FLAT cable to be conveyed in some manner?

Mr. Tweedy. To be discussed.

Mr. Baron. Between the Chief of Station and perhaps the Ambassador?

Mr. Tweedy. Discussed; only orally.

Mr. Baron. By contrast, the YQPROP cable clearly would have been restricted to the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. I have no reason to believe that the YQPROP business was discussed with the Ambassador, I do not believe it was, although Mr. Dulles, in his original cable, said he could, if he wanted to.

Mr. Baron. Let us introduce as the final exhibit for the moment Exhibit 12, a cable of October 17, 1960 going to Jadwin from the Chief of Station.

In this cable, the Chief of Station is responding to your suggestion that a senior case officer might be dispatched to the Congo to handle the YQPROP operation. He says it is an excellent idea. Is that a fair interpretation?

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TOP SECRET

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 12 for identification.)

TOP SECRET

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Mr. Baron. The Chief of Station then makes a suggestion in the fourth paragraph for equipment that might be provided if such a case officer were to be sent. He says, "If case officer sent, recommend Headquarters pouch soonest high powered foreign make rifle with telescopic sight and silencer. Hunting good here when lights right. However as hunting rifles now forbidden, would keep rifle in office pending opening of hunting season."

Would you take that to be a recommendation by the Chief of Station, if a case officer was sent to the Congo to concentrate on the YQPROP operation, he should be provided with the kind of weapon that would be suited for a sniper shot at Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes. Not necessarily to be fired by the case officer, obviously not, but at least used in the operation.

Mr. Baron. This reference to the hunting season can be taken as a reference obliquely to the fact that Lumumba was in UN custody and that there would not be, in effect, "open season" on him until he showed his face outside of UN custody. Would that be a fair interpretation?

Mr. Tweedy. I would not have interpreted it quite the same way. I would have interpreted it this way, which was if it, as a result of Headquarters suggestion that a rifle be provided to the Station, the Station would come up with an operational plan involving the use of the rifle which Headquarters would approve, and that thus, in effect, the operation was on

by a rifle, that would be the opening of the hunting season. In other words, the point where they knew how it could be used and Headquarters had approved its use.

Mr. Baron. I have one other general question before we take a break, and that is, returning to Sidney Gottlieb's account of his conversation with Richard Bissell about making preparations for carrying off an assassination against an African foreign leader if it were required, Gottlieb said in that context that he had higher authority for such an operation. Gottlieb also said that he clearly interpreted Bissell to mean that Bissell had Presidential authority for such an operation? Did you have any knowledge of such a conversation between Gottlieb and Bissell from any source?

tape 2b

Mr. Tweedy. I do not recall that Gottlieb and I ever discussed higher authority and approval. I do not say that it did not occur. If Gottlieb said that he had this impression in talking to Bissell, I cannot say no, but I cannot comment on it further.

Mr. Baron. For the moment, we have no further questions and we will take a break now and pick up again before the full Committee and Executive Session this afternoon.

Thank you very much for your patience in going through these documents one by one. It has been extremely helpful to us.

(Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m. the hearing concluded.)

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: ALLEN W. DULLES
UNIT: DCI
EXT: 6301
DATE: AUGUST 26, 1960

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: CCP
INFO: [illegible]

PRIORITY

OUT62966

LEOP INFO CITE DIR 47587

PRIORITY

RYBAT

FOR ROBERT GUTHMAN FROM ASCHAM

1. IN HIGH QUARTERS HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL CONTINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITABLE RESULT WILL AT BEST BE CHAOS AND AT WORST PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PRESTIGE OF THE UN AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE FREE XX WORLD GENERALLY. CONSEQUENTLY WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE AND THAT UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION.

2. HENCE WE WISH TO GIVE YOU WIDER AUTHORITY ALONG LINES LEOP 0772 AND LEOP 0745 AND DIR 46115 INCLUDING EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT. WE REALIZE THAT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY MAY PRESENT THEMSELVES TO YOU AND IN ADDITION TO SUMS HERETOFORE AUTHORIZED, WE FURTHER AUTHORIZE EXPENDITURE

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — SECRET — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

DIRECTOR

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

OUT 62366
DIR 47567

PAGE 2

INFO

:P TO A TOTAL OF $100,000 TO CARRY OUT ANY CRASH PROGRAMS ON WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT HIM. ADVISE YOUR CASH NEEDS.

3. TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRE TO BE CONSULTED, YOU SHOULD SEEK HIS CONCURRENCE. IF IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE HE DOES NOT WISH TO BE CONSULTED YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE.

4. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN SEEN AND APPROVED AT COMPETENT LEVEL ODACID.

END OF MESSAGE

*(IN 39706)
**(IN 41722)
***(OUT 59959)

CABLE SECRETARIAT: LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MR. HELMS.

SEP 24 1975

CIA

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SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

C/AF SRB

2445

DATE: 19 September 1960

SECRET

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF

INFO: DDP, S/C 2

ROUTING	
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Sep 19 19 19 46

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X	PRIORITY
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

71464

OUT 71464

TO (PRITY) LEOP INFO CITE DIR 014...

EYES ONLY GUTHMAN FROM JADWIN

RYBAT YQPROP

1. IDEN PROCEEDING BRAZZAVILLE SHORTLY AND SHOULD ARRIVE APPROX 27 SEPT. HE WILL MAKE HIS WAY LEOP SOONEST THEREAFTER AND CALL YOU AT OFFICE ON ARRIVAL. WILL ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS "SID FROM PARIS". BRIEF COVER DISCUSSION WILL THEN BE HELD IN WHICH "SID" SUGGESTS MEETING YOU AT OFFICE AND YOU WILL RESPOND BY AGREEING AND SETTING THE TIME. HOWEVER THE ACTUAL MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE ONE HOUR EARLIER THAN TIME MENTIONED IN THIS CONVERSATION AND IN FRONT MAIN ENTRANCE NEW STANLEY HOTEL. "SID" WILL CARRY UNROLLED COPY OF "PARIS MATCH" IN LEFT HAND.

2. IT URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE IDEN SOONEST POSSIBLE AFTER HE PHONES YOU. HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFY HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS A[illegible]MENT TO YOU. HOWEVER HIS ETA NOT FIRM AND YOU SHOULD NOT BE CONCERNED BY SOME DELAY.

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SECRET

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NW

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

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INFO

PAGE TWO

3. ACKNOWLEDGE ABOVE SOONEST, WITH ANY REVISIONS YOU WISH MAKE IN ABOVE PROCEDURES. CONTINUE USE YOPROP INDICATOR ALL TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOU INSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO YOURSELF.

END OF MESSAGE

DD/P
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

C/AF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FROM: B. Tweedy 589

UNIT: C/AF

EXT: 2445

DATE: 19 September 1960

SECRET

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

SEP 19 1960

PRECEDENCE: DEFERRED / ROUTINE / X PRIORITY / OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TO: LEOPOLDVILELE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF

INFO: DDP, S/C 2

71464

OUT 71465

(PRITY) LEOP INFO CITE DIR 01

RYBAT YQPROP

RE DIR 71464 (OUT 01443)

IDEN SIDNEY BRAUN.

END OF MESSAGE

DD/P
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

C/AF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

[illegible] Tweedy
C/AF
2445
22 September 1960

ROUTING

LEOPOLDVILLE

DIRECTOR

C/AF

DDP, C/S [illegible]

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

X PRIORITY

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

OUT 79837

(PRITY) LEOP INFO CITE DIR 0[illegible]

03094

EYES ONLY GUTHMAN

RYBAT YQPROP

RE LEOP 0026 (IN 18989)

[illegible] IF VERY WELCOME. COMMENTS FOLLOW.

A. RE 2A. CONCUR MAXIMUM USE SCHOTROFFE FOR COLLECT[illegible] OF INTEL. MUST REMAIN UNWITTING FOR TIME BEING ALTHOUGH [illegible] YOU WILL BE ASSESSING FOR MORE ACTIVE ROLE. ALTHOUGH [illegible] HAS APPARENTLY MAINTAINED SPLENDID COVER, MUST REMEMBER CLOSE EXAMINATION HIS BACKGROUND WILL REVEAL HE RESIDENT ALIEN PBPRIME, ONE LEG ON PBPRIME PASSPORT AND WIFE [illegible]

B. RE 2B. CONCUR THIS POSSIBILITY WORTH WATCHING BUT IF DECIDED SUPPORT FOR YQPROP OBJECTIVES, BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SU[illegible] BE PROVIDED THROUGH THIRD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH PBPRIME ROLE COMPLETELY CONCEALED. IMAGINE YOU CONCUR OUR BELIEF SUBJECT'S SECURITY LIKELY BE POOR AND LEAKS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY [illegible]CLUDE FRENCH

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

C. RE 2C. YOU MUST HAVE MUCH BETTER PERSPECTIVE PROMONTORIO THAN WE, BUT TRACES INDICATE BELGIAN I.S. CONN[illegible] AND THUS OUR COMMENTS ALONG LINES B ABOVE.

D. RE 2D. UNDERSTAND STATION HAS HAD REASONS QUESTI[illegible] NIBLAM REPORTING RELIABILITY AND WE MUST ASSUME BELGIAN CONNECTIONS COMMENTS AS ABOVE.

E. RE 2E. FROM TRACES HERE ASSUME SUBJECT MAY BE [illegible] ARM SUPPORTER OF KASAVUBU. NOTE PREVIOUS CZECH CONNECTIONS. COMMENTS ALSO AS ABOVE.

F. RE 2F. AWAITING YOUR FURTHER EXPLORATION CNA CAPTA[illegible] CERTAINLY INTERESTED ANY POSSIBLE CNA SOLUTION. THIS SHOULD PROVIDE MAXIMUM CREDIBILITY.

G. RE 2G. ASSUME YOU AGREE SUBJECT LEOP 0009 LIKELY BE MOST RISKY VEHICLE THESE PURPOSES.

SEP 24 1975

CIA

RE PARAS THREE AND FOUR, INTERESTED YOUR CONTINUING

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED	
ROUTINE	
PRIORITY	INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT [illegible]

INFO **PAGE THREE** CITE DIR [illegible]

ASSESSMENT 07 [redacted]BOTTLE AS GENUINE THIRD NATIONAL ASSET ON GROUND FO

WHATEVER ROLE THIS OP YOU MIGHT CONSIDER HIM. SOMEWHAT CONC

YOUR RECENT REPORT HE MISUNDERSTOOD OR DISOBEYED INSTRUCTIO

RE 06 [redacted] EXPLOITATION, BUT HIS APPARENT INCREASING ACCESS TO

MILIEU OF GREAT INTEREST. WE ARE CONSIDERING A THIRD NATIONAL

CUTOUT ~~CONTACT~~ CANDIDATE AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT FILL BILL AND WILL ADVI

SHORTLY.

3. NOT INTENDED YOU CONSTRUE ABOVE COMMENTS AS BASICALLY

NEGATIVE. YOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANNOT READ OVER YO

SHOULDER AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESS OPPORTUNITIES. OUR PRIMARY CONC

MUST BE CONCEALMENT PBPRIME ROLE, UNLESS OUTSTANDING OPPORTUN

EMERGES WHICH MAKES CALCULATED RISK FIRST CLASS BET. READY

ENTERTAIN ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS YOU MAKE BASED OUR HIGH REGA

BOTH YOUR PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible] 1975

Bundy

C/AF

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SECRET

2

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A. W. Dulles
DCI 570
2801
24 Sept. 60

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
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DEFERRED
ROUTINE
PRIORITY
X OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

OUT 73573

TO DIRECTOR

OP IM LEOP INFO CITE DIR 02521

RYBAT WIFLAT 07

FROM ASCHAM AND JADWIN

RE: LEOP 0002 (IN 17384)

1. APPRECIATE EXCELLENT REPORTING YOUR REFERENCE AND COMMEND SCHOTROFFE 04 HIS ALERT ROLE. WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP. SETTING HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE.

2. WHILE FULLY AWARE OF NEFARIOUS PLOTTING GHANA, GUINEA, UAR. TO RESTORE LUMUMBA, GREATLY DISTURBED AT REFERENCE TO MOROCCO AND PARTICULARLY TUNISIA AS MEMBERS OF THIS CLIQUE. CAN YOU SUGGEST ANY ACTION WE CAN PROPOSE ODACID OR TAKE OTHERWISE TO HELP DETACH THEM FROM LUMUMBA CAMP?

SEP 24 1975
CIA

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LEOPOLDVILLE

DIRECTOR

PAGE 2

DEFERRED | ROUTINE | PRIORITY | OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

INFO

3. DISTURBED AT POSSIBILITY THAT [redacted] MIGHT LOST CONTROL OF HIS FORCES DUE POSSIBLE HIGHER PAY BEING OFFERED SOURCES HOSTILE TO US AS SUGGESTED PARA 4 YOUR REFERENCE. IS PAY SITUATION IN ORDER AND CAN ANYTHING FURTHER BE DONE ABOUT THIS THROUGH UN OR COVERTLY THROUGH [redacted]?

4. AGREE POSITION OUTLINED LAST SENTENCE REFERENCE WHICH WE ASSUME IS FULLY ENDORSED BY AMBASSADOR.

5. AT YOUR DISCRETION, SHARE THIS MESSAGE WITH AMBASSADOR.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: [redacted] (2) reported on 23 September that Pierre Mulele, Gabriel Yumbu, and Antoine Gizenga of the PSA were mounting a coup against Mobutu and the Council of Commissioners

SEP 24 1975

CIA

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RECE[illegible] FROM

PAGE 2
SEP 2 1975

CIA

PRIORITY

IN 18989
LEOP 0226

D. WICLAM IN CONTACT 5 BALUBAS WHO HE SAYS ANXIOUS LAUNCH REF PROGRAM IF PROPER INSTRUMENTS AVAILABLE.

E. HECTOR GEORGES MASSIANGA RECENTLY TOLD ODACID OFFICER AND GUTHMAN HE IN CONTACT SMALL GROUP CNA TROOPS WHO WOULD PARTICIPATE IF RECEIVE FINANCIAL ENCOURAGEMENT. GUTHMAN WITHDREW FROM TALKS AND ARRANGED HAVE ODACID OFFICER INTRODUCE MASSIANGA [illegible] NO RESULTS. THIS COULD BE PUSHED THROUGH ANOTHER [illegible]

F. WICLAM TOLD BETTELHEIM HE IN CONTACT CNA CAPTAIN [illegible] REPRESENTS GROUP OF 4 (KASAVUBU, DEFENSE [illegible] OF COMMISSIONERS, BOLIKANGO AND CAPTAIN). ASKED WICLAM PUT HIM IN CONTACT BELGIAN, FRENCH OR OTHER GROUPS WILLING TRAIN AND ARM 1500 TROOPS LOCATED KITONA AREA. SAID HIS GROUP WANTS MOVE THEM LEOP IN ABOUT 8 DAYS TO TRY TAKE OVER CITY. PLAN NOT FEASIBLE AND DOUBT KASAVUBU AGREES. BUT MIGHT GET CAPTAIN INVOLVED REF OP.

G. SLIGHT CHANCE WIBOTTLE MIGHT TRY THROUGH SUBJECT LEOP 0209 (IN 18077).

3. PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS LISTED ABOVE, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY.

S E C R E T

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PAGE -3-

PRIORITY

IN 18969
LEOP 2220 [illegible]

04

[illegible] IF PARA [illegible] NOT FEASIBLE, [redacted] POSSIBLE [illegible]

FOR PLANS [illegible] AWARE [redacted] LIKE THIRD NAT[illegible]

IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FOR CUT-OUT FUNCTIONS, SUCH PERSON [illegible]

CONTRIBUTE TO [illegible]

END OF MESSAGE

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 22 1975
CIA

LEOPOLDVILLE

Sept 27

SEP 22 1975

CIA

REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRIORITY

IN 18989

DIR LEOP 0926

EYES ONLY JADWIN FROM GUTHMAN

RYBAT YQPROP

REF: DIR 01443 (OUT 71464)

1. IDEN REF CONTACTED 26 SEPTEMBER. WE ON SAME WAVE LENGTH. GUTHMAN AFRAID 01 [redacted] WEAKENING UNDER AFRO-ARAB PRESSURE. HENCE BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY INDICATED.

2. BASIS TALKS CONSIDERING POSSIBILITIES:

A. RECALL 01 [redacted] FROM STANLEYVILLE AND HAVE HIM TAKE ... WITH BIG BROTHER. WOULD THUS ACT AS INSIDE MAN TO BROTHER ... RAZOR EDGE. ALSO WOULD PROVIDE INFO ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL PROBLEM. GUTHMAN RECALLING 04 [redacted] TO LEOP.

B. SUBJECT LEOP 0981 (IN 16686) SAID HE PLANNED ACTION WITHIN 6 DAYS. DATE PASSED AND NO ACTION BUT IF PRICE RIGHT MIGHT GET SHOW ON ROAD.

C. 05 [redacted] WHO UNWITTING GUTHMAN POLITICAL CONTACT VISITED STATION 26 SEPTEMBER. EXPRESSED VIEW NEED TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION. SAID HAS NAMES 4-MAN SQUAD WHO WANT INTERVENE ACHIEVE POSITIVE SETTLEMENT. IF 05 [redacted] GROUP USED WOULD NEED CUT-OUT SUCH AS ROWTON. REALIZE PREFERABLE USE THIRD NATION...

S E C R E T

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DIRECTOR

LEOPOLDVILLE

C/AF (CR [redacted], AF DIV NOTIFIED 1940 30 SEP)

DDP, S/C 2

SEP 30 23 40'60

REC'D CABLE SECT.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 20857

DIR INFO CITE LEOP 0 [illegible]

EYES ONLY JADWIN FROM GUTHMAN

RYBAT YQPROP

REF: DIR 03094 (OUT 74837)

RE[illegible] [illegible]

SEP 22 1975

CIA

1. NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS NOW AVAIL[illegible]LE MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN CANCELLING OP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED RISKS OF VARYING DEGREES.

2. RE PARA 1 REF: WE BELIEVE [redacted] 04 BEST ASSET AVAILABLE. VIEW NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY, IF AT ALL, URGE HQS AUTHORIZE EXPLORATORY CONVERSATIONS TO DETERMINE IF [redacted] 04 WILLING TAKE ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP. (WOULD APPROACH ON HYPOTHETICAL BASIS AND NOT REVEAL PLANS). IF HE APPEARS WILLING ACCEPT ROLE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL OBJECTIVE OP TO HIM IN ORDER OBTAIN FULL VALUE HIS POTENTIAL. ALTHOUGH TOO EARLY SEE SPECIFIC DETAILS [redacted] 04 PART IN OP, BELIEVE RISK MINIMIZED IF HE LEAVES AREA BEFORE EFFECTS OP ARE APPARENT.

3. FEAR MIGHT HAVE OVERSTATED POSSIBILITY [redacted] 20 OTTLE PARTICIPATION. BELIEVE HE UNSUITED ROLE AT PRESENT TIME, VIEW POSSIBILITY MAY ALSO BE REPORTING TO [redacted] 11

SECRET

5/6R

NW

DIRECTOR

LEOPOLDVILLE

C/AF (DR ~~HOCCE~~, AF DIV NOTIFIED 1940 30 SEP)

DDP, S/C 2

SEP 30 23 40Z 60

REC'D CABLE SECT.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 20857

DIR INFO CITE LEOP 095[illegible]

EYES ONLY JADWIN FROM GUTHMAN

RE[illegible] FROM [illegible]

SEP 22 1975

CIA

RYBAT YQPROP

REF: DIR Ø3Ø94 (OUT 74837)

1. NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS NOW AVAIL. WE MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN CANCELLING OP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED RISKS OF VARYING DEGREES.

2. RE PARA 1 REF: WE BELIEVE [redacted] BEST ASSET AVAILABLE. VIEW NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY, IF AT ALL, URGE HQS AUTHORIZE EXPLORATORY CONVERSATIONS TO DETERMINE IF [redacted] WILLING TAKE ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP. (WOULD APPROACH ON HYPOTHETICAL BASIS AND NOT REVEAL PLANS). IF HE APPEARS WILLING ACCEPT ROLE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL OBJECTIVE OP TO HIM IN ORDER OBTAIN FULL VALUE HIS POTENTIAL. ALTHOUGH TOO EARLY SEE SPECIFIC DETAILS [redacted] PART IN OP, BELIEVE RISK MINIMIZED IF HE LEAVES AREA BEFORE EFFECTS OP ARE APPARENT.

3. FEAR MIGHT HAVE OVERSTATED POSSIBILITY [redacted] BOTTLE PARTICIPATION. BELIEVE HE UNSUITED ROLE AT PRESENT TIME, VIEW POSSIBILITY MAY ALSO BE REPORTING TO [redacted]

S E C R E T

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 22[illegible]
LEOP [illegible]

TO INFO CITE

4. NEW POSSIBILITY EXISTS VIEW 29 SEPTEMBER GUTHMAN KALISLE 1 TALKS. ALTHOUGH KALISLE 1 PREVIOUSLY FAVORED SUBJECT REF OP, NOW BELIEVES HIS ANGOLAN GROUP WOULD BE SUPPRESSED IN CONGO AND REPLACED BY GUINEAN SUPPORTED GROUP IF SUBJECT EVER REGAINS ASCENDANCY. EXPRESSED VIEW NEED TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION. THEREFORE PROPOSE EXPLORE KALISLE 1 THINKING SOONEST TO SEE HOW FAR HE WILLING GO AND DETERMINE HIS ASSETS. ASSUMING KALISLE 1 MEETING POSITIVE, DOES HQS CONSIDER HIM BE TRUE THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL FROM POINT VIEW SECURITY OF OP? IF KALISLE 1 REACTION FAVORABLE, BELIEVE THIS OFFERS MEANS ACHIEVE OBJECTIVE EARLY ON PAR WITH SCHOTROFFE IN SO FAR AS ACCESS AND SECURITY CONCERNED.

5. RE PARA 1F REF: AS OF NOW DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH INFO EVALUATE POTENTIAL OF CNA.

6. VIEW IMMINENT SCHOTROFFE AND KALISLE 1 MEETINGS, REQUEST HQS REPLY OPIM VIA EQUERRY LINK.

END OF MESSAGE

8/BR

SECRET

[redacted]

30 SEPTEMBER 1960

LEOPOLDVILLE

DIRECTOR

C/AF

DDP, S/C 2

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REVIEW PROGRAM

SEP 22 1975

OUT 75 CUT 75 03680

LEOP INFO CIA CITE DIR 03680

EYES ONLY GUTHMAN

RYBAT YQPROP

CS COMMENT: * URGED HQS AUTHORIZE EXPLORATORY TALKS TO DETERMINE IF SCHOTROFFE WILLING TO ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT.

RE LEOP 0052 (IN 20857)

1. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH [redacted] TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT ROLE. AGREE WITH YOU INITIAL DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE ON HYPOTHETICAL BASIS.

2. IT DOES APPEAR FROM HERE THAT OF POSSIBILITIES AVAILABLE [redacted] BEST. WE STILL HAVE SOME WORRY ABOUT PBPRIME STAY TOGETHER WITH QUESTION OF WIFE. HOWEVER WE WILL WEIGH VERY CAREFULLY YOUR INITIAL ASSESSMENT HIS ATTITUDE AS WELL AS ANY SPECIFIC APPROACHES THAT MAY EMERGE. WE WOULD HOPE THAT A FEW DAYS STATUS QUO SITUATION WOULD ALLOW FOR MODERATE HASTE.

3. IN ABSENCE MORE DETAILS WE ARE RELUCTANT CONSIDER [redacted]ISLE ONE. WHEREAS HE HAS BEEN LONG TIME CONTACT AND IN HIS SPECIFIC FIELD HE IS IN MOST RESPECTS AN AGENT WE WOULD STILL HAVE BASIC QUESTIONS AS TO CONTROL AND SECURITY. WE DO AGREE YOU SHOULD EXPLORE HIS THINKING WITH QUESTIONS MORE OBLIQUE THAN DIRECT. IF YOU FEEL WE ARE WRONG ON [redacted]ISLE ONE ASSESSMENT PLEASE ADVISE AFTER NEXT TALKS WITH HIM.

4. APPRECIATE FURTHER YOUR APPROACH TO PROBLEM.

(END OF MESSAGE)

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GLENN FIELDS C/AF

RELEASING OFFICER

Glenn Fields

S-E-C-R-E-T

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07 OCT 60 | SECRET

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DD/P, S/C 2

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REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRIORITY

IN 24171

LEOP 0

PRITY DIR

EYES ONLY JADWIN FROM GUTHMAN*

RYBAT YQPROP

REF: DIR 03583 (OUT 75900)**

1. IDEN DIR 01443 (OUT 71464) DEPARTED LEOP FOR PBPRIME 5 OCT, VIEW EXPIRATION DATE HIS MATERIALS. HOWEVER LEFT CERTAIN ITEMS OF CONTINUING USEFULNESS. GUTHMAN PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP.

2. CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION WITH [redacted] REF. AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES, ______ SUGGESTED SOLUTION RECOMMENDED BY HQS. ALTHOUGH DID NOT PICK UP BALL, BELIEVE HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY WITHIN LIMITS SECURITY ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE.

3. IF HQS BELIEVES ______ PBPRIME STAY OR LOCATION WIFE PERMANENT BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WISH STRESS NECESSITY PROVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL. RECRUITMENT SUCH ASSET LOCALLY NOT FEASIBLE VIEW SECURITY PROBLEM AND LIMITED NUMBER POTENTIAL ASSETS. ONLY OTHER POSSIBLE ASSET HERE IS WIROTTLE 1. GUTHMAN DOUBTS HE CAPABLE SUCH ACTION. ALSO FEAR HE MIGHT REVEAL DETAILS TO UNIONIST 0

SECRET

DATE: 07 OCT 68

SECRET

IN 24171

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4. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *EYES ONLY APPEARS TO BE IMPROPERLY USED. IN YOUR REPLY PLEASE ADVISE THE FIELD TO COMPLY WITH REGULATION [illegible].

**HQS AUTHORIZED GUTHMAN TO HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH
TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT ROLE

SECRET

SECRET

7 October 1960

LEOPOLDVILLE

DIRECTOR

FROM

1975

[illegible] PRIORITY

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

(PRITY) LEOP INFO CITE DIR 048[illegible]

RYBAT YQPROP

EYES ONLY GUTHMAN

XXXXXXXX

1. HAD GOOD DISCUSSION YOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT. COMMENTS FOLLOW:

A. BE ASSURED DID NOT EXPECT YQPROP OBJECTIVES BE REACHED IN SHORT PERIOD AND UNDERSTAND CURRENT SITUATION FULLY WARRANTED RETURN YOUR COLLEAGUE.

B. UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES SCHOTROFFE (04) SHOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE MADE WITTING BUT FUTURE CIRCUMSTANCES TARGET WILL CONTROL WHETHER YOU WISH RAISE THIS POSSIBILITY AGAIN FOR OP INTEL OR MORE ACTIVE ROLE.

C. MEANWHILE WE CONSIDERING DISPATCHING THIRD NATL OPERATOR WHO, WHEN HE ARRIVES, SHOULD THEN BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVER PERIOD TO SEE WHETHER HE MIGHT PLAY ACTIVE OR

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[illegible] CUTOUT ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS. IF YOU CONCLUDE HE SUITABLE AND BEARING IN MIND HEAVY EXTRA LOAD THIS PLACES ON YOU, WOULD EXPECT DISPATCH TDY SENIOR CASE OFFICER RUN THIS OP AND OUTSIDE AGENT FULL TIME UNDER YOUR DIRECTION. IN ANY CASE THIRD NATIONAL WOULD NOT BE WITTING PRIOR DISPATCH FROM HERE AND WOULD OSTENSIBLY BE SCHEDULED PERFORM GENERAL OPS ROLE. WILL ADVISE PROGRESS ON THIS MAN.

2. COLLEAGUE MENTIONED ARRIVAL YOUR FAMILY AND HOPE TAKE LUANDA WEEKEND. WARMLY SUPPORT THIS AND ANY OTHER SHORT LEAVE YOU CAN SCROUNGE. DO NOT WAIT TILL YOU TOO TIRED TO BENEFIT FROM IT.

END OF MESSAGE

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FROM: [illegible] F. [illegible]
UNIT: AFRICA
EXT: 3662
DATE: 15 October 1960

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

OUT 81476

LEOP INFO CITE DIR 05205

05235

RYBAT WIFLAT 02

RE A. LEOP 0101 (IN 25261)
B. LEOP 0104 (IN 25967)
C. LEOP 0072 (IN 23052)

WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS FOLLOWING:

A. FORMATION WIFLAT 1 01 [redacted] PRAETORIAN GUARD BY GIVING EXTRA PAY PERHAPS 25-50 PERCENT MORE THAN NOW BEING RECEIVED TO CORPS OF OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN UP TO 200. DO NOT FEEL THAT NATIONAL MILITARY SCHOOL GROUP CAN BE USED FOR THIS. RAISE QUESTION WHETH[ER] LOYALTY ENLISTED MEN COULD BE SO HELD FOR LONG. SUGGEST THIS BEST HANDLED BY GIVING FUNDS TO WIFLAT 4 02 FOR HIM TO GIVE TO WIFLAT 1 01. PURPOSE THIS TO USE WIFLAT 4 02 TO KEEP HIS 01 SPINE STRENGTHENED.

B. AMMUNITION: WHAT RESERVES AMMUNITION TO BE HELD UNDER WIFLAT 1 01 CONTROL WOULD BE REQUIRED. ASSUME 10,000 ROUNDS FOR SMALL ARMS MIGHT SUFFICE. WE WOULD REQUIRE INFO CALIBRE AND

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PAGE TWO

TYPE WEAPONS INVOLVED. POSSIBLE METHODS DELIVERY ARE FOR [redacted] 02 CLAM PLANE TO TRANSPORT FROM ADJACENT TERRITORY, OR POSSIBLY FROM MATADI BY PLANE OR TRUCK. ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE GIVE MONEY TO [redacted] 02 LAT 5 TO GIVE TO [redacted] 02 LAT 7 FOR HIM TO PURCHASE DIRECT AND HAND OVER TO [redacted] 01

C. [redacted] 02 ROAK - IN VIEW OUR DISTRUST SUBJECT REF A EXPLORE [redacted] 02 CLAM KNOWLEDGE OF AND ACCESS TO FETICHEURS TO DETERMINE WHETHER BUYING OFF FETICHEUR AS [redacted] 02 ROAK SPIRITUAL SUPPORT MIGHT BE SERIOUS BLOW TO HIM. ONLY DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NOW STAND BEHIND IS TO SUPPORT IMMOBILIZING OR ARRESTING [redacted] 02 ROAK, DESIRABLE AS MORE DEFINITIVE ACTION MIGHT BE. ANY ACTION TAKEN WOULD HAVE TO BE ENTIRELY CONGOLESE. HOWEVER, WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS FOR OUR REVIEW ON ANY WAY THIS COULD POSSIBLY BE ACCOMPLISHED.

END OF MESSAGE

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15 October 1960 511

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OUTE 1337

CITE DIR 06252

(PRITY) LEOP INFO

RYBAT YOPROP

EYES ONLY GUTHMAN

1. YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROUGH NORMAL CHANNEL CURRENTLY BEING TRANSMITTED A PARA ON YOPROP TYPE SUGGESTION[illegible] YOU WILL PROBABLY RECEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBLI[illegible] BLOC WIROAK REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALL STUDYING C[illegible] SITUATION CLOSELY AND HIS DISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES N[illegible] ONE CONSIDERATION. FOR EXAMPLE WE HAD SOME AFRICAN TALKS W[illegible] FRENCH SERVICE THIS WEEK AND RE CONGO THEY CAME UP WITH THIS IMMEDIATELY. (NO INDICATION AT ALL FRENCH SERVICE DOING ANYTHING SPECIFIC ABOUT IT.)

2. RAISE ABOVE SO YOU NOT CONFUSED BY ANY APPARENT DUPLI[illegible] TION. THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED COLLEAGUE AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY. RE DIR 04302, [illegible] YOUR REACTION TO POSSIBLE DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OF[illegible]

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REC'D ... FROM
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PAGE TWO CITE DIR [illegible]

SOONEST TO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY THIS ASPECT. WE STILL WORKI[illegible] ON THIRD NATIONAL MENTIONED THAT REF, BUT WONDER WHETHER YOU THINK EARLY ARRIVAL CASE OFFICER WOULD MAKE SENSE. SEEMS T[illegible] US YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS TOO HEAVY GIVE NECESSARY CONCENT[illegible] YQPROP. ADVISE.

3. HAVE DISCUSSED NICLAM WITH BETTELHEIM AND POSSIBILI[illegible] COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR ABDUCTION WIROAK, EITHER VIA ASSAU[illegible] ON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR, MORE PROBABLY, IF WIROAK ATTEMPTS ANOTHER BREAKOUT INTO TOWN AS RECENTLY. PICKED O[illegible] OF WIFLAT 1 FCNA TROOPS MIGHT ALSO BE CONSIDERED. REQUEST YOU[illegible] VIEWS.

END OF MESSAGE

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PRIORITY

IN 25936

DIR INFO CITE LEOP 0145

EYES ONLY JADWIN FROM GUTHMAN

RYBAT YQPROP

REF: A. DIR 04812 (OUT 78336)

B. DIR 06250 (OUT 81396) *

1. [redacted] HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENTOURAGE. THUS HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPS INTEL NEEDED THIS JOB.

2. BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER HANDLE [illegible] OPS EXCELLENT IDEA. ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST THIS OP, ABLE DEVOTE ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT TIME, VIEW MULTIPLE OPS COMMITMENTS. SITUATION WILL BE EVEN MORE COMPLICATED WHEN [illegible] GOES ELIZ 19 OCTOBER. IF CASE OFFICER AVAILABLE, GUTHMAN WOULD DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTING AND DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS.

3. SERIOUSLY DOUBT POSSIBILITY ASSAULT HOUSE, VIEW STRONG [illegible] CONCUR OP FEASIBLE IF SUBJECT GOES OUT INTO TOWN BUT VIEW UNA [illegible] WATCHING HOUSE, DOUBT HE WILL TRY THIS IN NEAR FUTURE. BELIEVE POSSIBLE TO MOUNT COMMANDO, PER REF B, BUT ASSUME HQS WOULD WANT THIS DONE BY THIRD NATIONAL ASSET.

4. IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HQS POUCH SOONEST HIGH

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IN 2893

LEOP 01

INFO CITE

POWERED FOREIGN MAKE RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SIGHT AND SILENCER HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGHT. HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLE NOW FORBIDDEN, WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED STA VIEWS RE POSSIBILITY USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR ABDUCTION (SUBJ).